We study the well-known coded caching problem in an online learning framework, wherein requests arrive sequentially, and an online policy can update the cache contents based on the history of requests seen thus far. We introduce a caching policy based on the Follow-The-Perturbed-Leader principle and show that for any time horizon T and any request sequence, it achieves a sub-linear regret of \mathcal{O}(\sqrt(T) ) with respect to an oracle that knows the request sequence beforehand. Our study marks the first examination of adversarial regret in the coded caching setup. Furthermore, we also address the issue of switching cost by establishing an upper bound on the expected number of cache updates made by our algorithm under unrestricted switching and also provide an upper bound on the regret under restricted switching when cache updates can only happen in a pre-specified subset of timeslots. Finally, we validate our theoretical insights with numerical results using a real-world dataset

Components of cyber physical systems, which affect real-world processes, are often exposed to the internet. Replacing conventional control methods with Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) in energy systems is an active area of research, as these systems become increasingly complex with the advent of renewable energy sources and the desire to improve their efficiency. Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are vulnerable to specific perturbations of their inputs or features, called adversarial examples. These perturbations are difficult to detect when properly regularized, but have significant effects on the ANN's output. Because DRL uses ANN to map optimal actions to observations, they are similarly vulnerable to adversarial examples. This work proposes a novel attack technique for continuous control using Group Difference Logits loss with a bifurcation layer. By combining aspects of targeted and untargeted attacks, the attack significantly increases the impact compared to an untargeted attack, with drastically smaller distortions than an optimally targeted attack. We demonstrate the impacts of powerful gradient-based attacks in a realistic smart energy environment, show how the impacts change with different DRL agents and training procedures, and use statistical and time-series analysis to evaluate attacks' stealth. The results show that adversarial attacks can have significant impacts on DRL controllers, and constraining an attack's perturbations makes it difficult to detect. However, certain DRL architectures are far more robust, and robust training methods can further reduce the impact.

This work tackles the complexities of multi-player scenarios in \emph{unknown games}, where the primary challenge lies in navigating the uncertainty of the environment through bandit feedback alongside strategic decision-making. We introduce Thompson Sampling (TS)-based algorithms that exploit the information of opponents' actions and reward structures, leading to a substantial reduction in experimental budgets -- achieving over tenfold improvements compared to conventional approaches. Notably, our algorithms demonstrate that, given specific reward structures, the regret bound depends logarithmically on the total action space, significantly alleviating the curse of multi-player. Furthermore, we unveil the \emph{Optimism-then-NoRegret} (OTN) framework, a pioneering methodology that seamlessly incorporates our advancements with established algorithms, showcasing its utility in practical scenarios such as traffic routing and radar sensing in the real world.

This paper studies distributed online learning under Byzantine attacks. The performance of an online learning algorithm is often characterized by (adversarial) regret, which evaluates the quality of one-step-ahead decision-making when an environment provides adversarial losses, and a sublinear bound is preferred. But we prove that, even with a class of state-of-the-art robust aggregation rules, in an adversarial environment and in the presence of Byzantine participants, distributed online gradient descent can only achieve a linear adversarial regret bound, which is tight. This is the inevitable consequence of Byzantine attacks, even though we can control the constant of the linear adversarial regret to a reasonable level. Interestingly, when the environment is not fully adversarial so that the losses of the honest participants are i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed), we show that sublinear stochastic regret, in contrast to the aforementioned adversarial regret, is possible. We develop a Byzantine-robust distributed online momentum algorithm to attain such a sublinear stochastic regret bound. Extensive numerical experiments corroborate our theoretical analysis.

This paper investigates the resilience and robustness of Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) policies to adversarial perturbations in the state space. Accordingly, we first present an approach for the disentanglement of vulnerabilities caused by representation learning of DRL agents from those that stem from the sensitivity of the DRL policies to distributional shifts in state transitions. Building on this approach, we propose two RL-based techniques for quantitative benchmarking of adversarial resilience and robustness in DRL policies against perturbations of state transitions. We demonstrate the feasibility of our proposals through experimental evaluation of resilience and robustness in DQN, A2C, and PPO2 policies trained in the Cartpole environment.